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‘It’s not a part of me, but it is what it is’: The struggle of becoming en-wheeled 1 
after spinal cord injury 2 
Abstract 3 
Purpose: Many people who experience spinal cord injury become long-term wheelchair 4 
users. This article addresses the process of becoming en-wheeled through the case 5 
example of a disabled man called Patrick.  6 
Design: An intrinsic case study informed by posthumanist developments was used. 7 
Within this design, Patrick and his manual wheelchair were the entangled participants of 8 
the inquiry. 9 
Methods: Interviews and fieldwork observation with Patrick were conducted. 10 
Qualitative data were analysed using the posthumanist notion of ‘assemblages’. 11 
Results: The results illuminate Patrick’s struggle of negotiating a new embodied 12 
selfhood that includes the wheelchair. Patrick engaged in ableist rehabilitation after 13 
spinal cord injury to recuperate the capacity to walk and break his connection with the 14 
wheelchair. After extensive treatment of his body, he reluctantly assumed his cyborg or 15 
posthuman condition. 16 
Conclusion: The analysis and discussion resulted in a theoretical frame that presents 17 
the notions of positive and negative enwheelment as two ends of a continuum. In doing 18 
so, the paper offers a useful tool for understanding and addressing enwheelment plus 19 
other cyborgification processes. We advocate for its acceptance into the disability 20 
studies and rehabilitation practice repertoire. 21 
 22 
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Worldwide, ∼2.5 million people live with spinal cord injury (SCI), with more 27 
than 130,000 new injuries reported each year. SCI results in the impairment of the 28 
communication between the brain and the rest of the body. This impairment affects 29 
several body functions, including the capacity to walk. As a result, many individuals 30 
living with SCI require the use of a wheelchair to move. Not surprisingly, this 31 
‘implement technology’ [1] alters the way new users experience the world around them, 32 
and changes their relations with their bodies and the bodies of others. Wheelchairs 33 
matter because they shape people’s journey through life, where and how far they can go, 34 
and whom they could go with. Therefore, addressing the evolving meanings and roles of 35 
wheelchair use throughout the life of a person is important to understand the 36 
complexities of living with SCI and disability in society.  37 
Despite being a ‘worthy topic’ [2], the relationship between disabled people and 38 
their wheelchairs has received very little focussed attention in disability and 39 
rehabilitation studies. One notable exception is the work of Winance [3-5], who 40 
explored the mutual shaping of disabled people and their wheelchairs through the 41 
processes of material and emotional adjustment. Another exception is the work of 42 
Papadimitriou [6], who used the term ‘en-wheeled’ to refer to individuals with new SCI 43 
learning how to use and live through their wheelchairs. Becoming en-wheeled is a 44 
process of accepting the wheelchair as an extension and integral part of one’s body and 45 
its habitual actions. In this sense, long-term wheelchair users epitomise what Haraway 46 
described as cyborgs or human–machine hybrids [7]. 47 
According to Sparkes et al. [8], the process of becoming en-wheeled is a key 48 
aspect of cyborgification for people post-SCI. Briefly, cyborgification denotes the 49 




along a continuum from those that require very little technological aid to those who 51 
benefit greatly from technology. Likewise, Norman and Moola [10] noted that cyborgs 52 
range from the apparently trivial, such as corrective eyewear, to more anxiety-inducing 53 
forms, such as restorative prosthetics. Whatever is the case, the metaphor of the cyborg 54 
problematizes the supposedly clear boundary between human body and assistive 55 
technology. As part of this concern, theories of the posthuman or cyborg have 56 
reconsidered the question of agency. 57 
From a humanist perspective, “agency is an innate characteristic of the 58 
essentialist, intentional free subject” [11, p.733]. In contrast, posthumanism views 59 
agency as “enacted, generated in, with, and through interactions and entanglements of 60 
people with technologies as part of more-than-human worlds” [12, p.29]. Underpinning 61 
this viewpoint are two core arguments. First, not only is agency attributed to humans, 62 
but also to non-humans and matter. Matter has agentic capacity, that is to say, the ability 63 
to animate, to act, to generate reactions. In practice, this implies that “one has to 64 
suppress his or her humanist assumption that human beings act and material objects are 65 
simply used” [13, p. 114]. Second, agency is horizontally distributed and relational. 66 
Agency is not restricted to a bounded subject, but exists in relational networks or 67 
assemblages of human and non-human actors that operate together as a whole. For 68 
example, a human body comes together with a wheelchair in order to configure a 69 
human-nonhuman assemblage that works as a functional entity. Within this intimate 70 
assemblage, there is no clear distinction between the individual and the wheelchair. As 71 
Pickering [14, p. 26] noted, “the human actors are still there but now inextricably 72 
entangled with the nonhuman”. 73 
To express the interplay of human and nonhuman agency, Pickering uses the 74 




Importantly, the elements participating in this ‘dance’ do not possess agency in and of 76 
themselves, but are mutually and emergently constitutive of one another. As Freeman 77 
[15] puts it, “human and nonhuman entities co-construct dynamic and influential 78 
networks of associations”. Thus, a person living with SCI becomes in an emergent 79 
relation with the wheelchair in the human body-wheelchair assemblage. Both become 80 
together by virtue of being connected. This means that not just the components in the 81 
assemblage act, but the assemblage itself acts. Bennett [16] named this ‘agentic 82 
assemblage’. 83 
As agentic, assemblages are always evolving to include broader network 84 
connections with other assemblages. Given this interconnectedness, it is impossible to 85 
conceptualize the human body–wheelchair assemblage as consisting only of these two 86 
elements [17,18]. Therefore, addressing the basic human body–wheelchair assemblage 87 
requires also considering the relations with other affecting elements (e.g., walkers, 88 
disability discourses) and broader assemblages, e.g., rehabilitation environments 89 
[Reference removed for double blind review 2]. However, as Brownlie and Spandler 90 
[19] warned, these relations are extensive, so we have to be selective. In this regard, 91 
researchers make what Barad [20] termed ‘agential cuts’ in deciding what to focus on 92 
and how to present their arguments. As Lupton put it (11, no page), “they engage in 93 
creative imaginings in attempting to map the entanglements, assemblages… and 94 
becomings that are represented in research participants’ words and practices’”. In this 95 
article, we enact an agential cut in order to focus on the human body-wheelchair 96 
assemblage along with its key relations with other assemblages and elements. We do 97 
this empirically by documenting and discussing the process of becoming en-wheeled of 98 






This article is grounded on a four-year project designed to travel Patrick’s 102 
journey through illness and disability. Patrick is a 46-year-old man diagnosed with 103 
chordoma, a poor prognostic cancer that is aggressive and locally invasive [21]. Given 104 
that his chordoma is located at the thoracic spine, it caused damage in the spinal cord. 105 
Over a span of six years, he had six life-threatening surgeries in order to remove the 106 
tumour. Each new surgery provoked further harm in his spine, eventually resulting in a 107 
complete paraplegia. 108 
X first met Patrick in an adapted gym where the former was a volunteer, and 109 
invited him to participate in a series of recorded interviews that would explore his 110 
experience of illness and disability. Prior to data collection, the research obtained the 111 
approval of the Ethics Committee of Research on Humans from the University Y. In 112 
accordance with ethical requirements, Patrick gave written informed consent to 113 
voluntarily participate in the project and was fully aware of his ability to withdraw at 114 
any stage without reprisal. Thenceforth, consent was processual and fully informed. 115 
This means that Patrick was invited to review his participation as the research project 116 
progressed and it became clearer what his role might entail.  117 
Throughout the project, three data-prompted interviews were conducted [22]. 118 
The personalized prompts included images, objects and text, which served to stimulate 119 
discussion in the interview setting. The interviews were loosely structured, and Patrick 120 
was encouraged to share stories about his experiences in his own words and according 121 
to his own relevancies. X invited Patrick to reflect upon key events, and to discuss his 122 
connection with different ‘disability artifacts’ [23]. To do so, detail-oriented, 123 
elaboration and clarification probes were used [24]. Probes included ‘could you tell me 124 




‘How did that affected your life?’ ‘Could you explain that further?’ All the interviews 126 
were conducted at Patrick’s home and totalled six hours. Alongside with these 127 
interviews, participant observation and informal interviews via telephone and instant 128 
messaging were conducted. To ensure a nonhierarchical relationship with Patrick, X 129 
became involved in a reciprocal sharing of his personal stories. Thanks to the sincere 130 
rapport built throughout the research, Patrick started to contact him by own initiative to 131 
share new stories, images and personal thoughts. The information exchange gradually 132 
increased, and this prolonged contact with Patrick allowed to gather interesting and 133 
significant data on enwheelment without forcing the emergence of the topic. Currently, 134 
X has abandoned the role of the researcher, but he is still in permanent contact with 135 
Patrick to support him and keep listening his stories.  136 
Given the multi-layered nature of the research, supportive but ‘critical friends’ 137 
versed in qualitative research, disability and physical activity were also involved in the 138 
elaboration of the project. Their role was to stimulate reflexivity and alternative views, 139 
examine matters like theoretical preferences, and ask provocative questions regarding 140 
data and writing [25]. This collaboration resulted in some previous works on the case 141 
[XXX], which were useful to provide a preliminary backdrop for the particular focus of 142 
this paper. 143 
The data were analysed using narrative analysis that was sensitized by a ‘more-144 
than-human’ perspective [26]. That is to say, while narrative research focuses on 145 
humans and the meanings they construct as the primary source of data, we incorporated 146 
attention to materiality through the analysis, thus shifting the focus from Patrick and his 147 
stories to include a consideration of non-human entities. Accordingly, we used the 148 
notion of assemblage as the key analytical reference. This notion has proved useful to 149 




essentialist understandings of the impaired body [27,17]. For our study, we have 151 
inspired in the he work of Gibson [e.g. 28,29,30], who demonstrated –theoretically and 152 
empirically– how thinking through assemblages is an ingenious and fruitful way of 153 
addressing the relationships between people and technologies in the context of 154 
rehabilitation. Importantly, her work shows how assemblage thinking focuses on 155 
processual, rather than fixed connections. Accordingly, we do not just examine the 156 
combination of elements comprising the assemblage (Patrick and the wheelchair), but 157 
also the consequences resulting from the different ways those elements interact, i.e., the 158 
process of becoming en-wheeled.  159 
Against this analytical backdrop, our exploration proceeded as follows. First, we 160 
examined data to describe and interpret how Patrick’s enwheelment developed over 161 
time.  Second, we discussed these interpretations by reading them in relation to other 162 
cases of enwheelment available in literature. Here, we identified significant contrasts 163 
between the ways Patrick and other people talked about, perceived and felt the 164 
wheelchair. We interpreted those contrasts through posthuman disability studies in order 165 
to amplify and deepen our insights. This discussion prompted us to engage in theory 166 
building. Progressively, our reflections led to the identification of two modes of 167 
enwheelment that, remarkably, spread to other types of cyborgification. 168 
 169 
Restitution assemblage 170 
The doctor said to me, ‘Man, use the wheelchair!’ and so. No, I do not want to, 171 
man. I want to walk again, you know? 172 
 173 
Patrick’s process of becoming en-wheeled was framed by restitution. Although 174 




stories [31, Reference removed for double blind review 1], it can also be seen as an 176 
agentic assemblage made up of narrative and material components [Reference removed 177 
for double blind review 2]. This large assemblage includes smaller assemblages made of 178 
stories, interactions, medical and rehabilitation procedures, bodies, objects, buildings 179 
and fluids that work together to produce specific practices of becoming. In the case of 180 
Patrick, these practices were oriented to turn the ‘I can no longer walk’ of his injured 181 
embodiment into ‘I can walk again’.  182 
Given his focus on walking again, Patrick did not embraced the wheelchair. 183 
However, that Patrick neglected the possibility of incorporating it in his way of being 184 
did not prevent him to develop a positive and productive cyborg identity in relation to 185 
other technologies. For instance, he accepted and celebrated massive inorganic materials 186 
(i.e. prosthesis) inside of him, which allowed him to function on a daily basis (Figure 1). 187 
Indeed, he viewed this ‘metalwork’ as a “medical piece of art” i and part of the 188 









Figure 1. The prosthesis 198 
 199 
Patrick: The photo is awesome. In the middle you can see all the machinery (...) 200 
Fourteen screws there… it’s a worthwhile image. 201 




Patrick: Of course, I knew it was me. I knew it was me, man. 203 
 204 
The prosthesis, which Butryn [1] catalogued as ‘self technologies’, were 205 
compatible with the restitution assemblage, as they had the ability to normalise the 206 
body. In contrast, the wheelchair reminded Patrick of the impossibility of walking 207 
again, that is, of recovering his ‘normal’ life prior to SCI. In this sense, using the 208 
wheelchair was incompatible with restitution. At the same time, though, the wheelchair 209 
was a constitutive part of restitution, playing an active role in the shaping of Patrick’s 210 
experience of SCI. Specifically, it worked as a looking glass that forced comparisons 211 
between past, present and future [32]. The wheelchair threatened the temporal 212 
orientation of restitution, as well as its designed endpoint (i.e. walking again). With the 213 
restitution narrative operating, Patrick’s anticipations of the future, or ‘material 214 
imaginings’ [33], omitted the wheelchair. In restitution terms, the acknowledgement of 215 
Patrick-wheelchair would represent the acceptance of a defeat. 216 
 217 
Ableist rehabilitation 218 
Patrick regarded the wheelchair as a problem to overcome or eliminate through 219 
engaging in ableist rehabilitation. Ableism is a pervasive ideology that discriminates 220 
disabled people and characterises them as inferior to the non-disabled [34]. By ableist 221 
rehabilitation, we refer to those conceptions and practices aiming to restore the ‘normal’ 222 
life and body that ableism uphold as leitmotifs of successful citizenry. Patrick’s 223 
rehabilitation represented a fight to return to health or to normalcy, rather than a process 224 
of becoming newly abled. He equated recuperating what was lacking (the capacity to 225 
walk) with better rehabilitation outcomes, fitting the ableist logic that favour legitimated 226 




wheelchair users). As a strategy to maintain the narrative of progression to functional 228 
recovery, Patrick tried to replace the wheelchair with a walker.  229 
I used a walker, dragging my legs! The ambulance left me at the threshold of the 230 
hospital door, well, in, let's say where the hospital gym was, and I went inside, 231 
thud, thud, thud, dragging my legs as I could, uh, dude. Anyway, trying my best 232 
to be able to walk again, that was my goal. 233 
 234 
Walking (or dragging the legs) with the walker was a form of passing as an ‘able 235 
body’. Disability passing refers to the way people conceal social markers of impairment 236 
(such as the wheelchair) to pass as ‘normal’ [35]. By avoid using the wheelchair to go 237 
into the hospital gym, Patrick sought to pass as someone whose ‘liberation’ from the 238 
wheelchair was, in his words, a question of “patience, time, and hard work in the gym”. 239 
Over time, he worked out compulsively in different environments as a means to discard 240 
the wheelchair and approximate independent functioning [Reference removed for 241 
double blind review 2]. The following comment on the exercise routine that Patrick 242 
followed in the personal gym is illustrative of how he lived enwheelment as an 243 
individual problem to overcome and correct through will power. 244 
For me the magic was to walk again. And that magic would come by what I did, 245 
by my discipline, every morning [in the gym] and working out to the limit to 246 
walk again (…) I would do 300 push-ups a day, in a series of 50… 50, urgh, 247 
urgh, urgh! Man, I tell you, no wheelchair, …to my top, you know, …trying to 248 
reverse the situation.  249 
 250 




Patrick was adamant in clarifying that the wheelchair was not, and will not 252 
become, a part of him. He viewed the wheelchair as an instrument that provided him a 253 
provisional solution to his bodily ‘lack’ or “a temporary means of transport”. When 254 
asked about the reasons why he refused the wheelchair to be a companion all over his 255 
disability journey, he said: 256 
My rejection of the wheelchair was given by the limitations that I understood it 257 
was going to produce if I stayed confined to it. Well, for example, I loved 258 
walking through the mountain or walking through the mountain with my kids. 259 
And the wheelchair was going to prevent me from doing that. Therefore, the 260 
chair was an obstacle to what I liked to do until that time. So I escaped from the 261 
chair because I wanted to do that again. Because I didn’t want to stay confined 262 
to the chair again, given the physical limitations that it would produce in me. 263 
 264 
Underlying this comment is the notion of the wheelchair as an obstacle to 265 
accomplish restitution, as well as Patrick’s assumption that his situation regarding 266 
wheelchair use depended on his intentionality and free will. Through the years, Patrick 267 
rejected the wheelchair “because I was completely sure that I was going to walk again”. 268 
However, the possibility of “escaping” from the wheelchair did not last forever. The last 269 
(palliative) surgery, along with several conversations with doctors, convinced Patrick 270 
that standing up and walk will be unviable for him: “Now the tumour pinches the spine 271 
and does not let me walk again, so I begin to assimilate the idea… that this is going to 272 
be definitive, long-term, man. Well, this is a big shock”. This ‘shock’ represented a 273 
bodily awareness and the subsequent assimilation of SCI, which led to a focus on 274 




I am convinced I won't get rid of it anymore because of the circumstances …, I 276 
slowly realised that my normal situation was the wheelchair now (…) the 277 
wheelchair, well, it limits me, it fucks me up because I know that there are a 278 
number of things I won't be able to do (…) but it is what it is. 279 
 280 
Patrick resignedly assumed that he depended on the wheelchair then on. To 281 
paraphrase Peers and Eales [36, p. 112], the wheelchair ended up being a necessary 282 
solution to which Patrick became “uncomfortably dependent upon”.  283 
 284 
Discussing Patrick’s enwheelment and beyond 285 
For most people with SCI, wheelchairs are not a choice, but a consequence of 286 
living with impairment. Wheelchair users become tangled in the human-wheelchair 287 
assemblage (i.e., they become en-wheeled) notwithstanding their hopes and 288 
expectations. Enwheelment, we argue, is a reality that proceeds regardless of whether 289 
persons with SCI attend to it, or how they choose to make sense of it. Decisively, 290 
enwheelment is underpinned by a posthuman ontology, which is faithful to the 291 
reciprocal and distributed nature of agency. Seen in this light, people with SCI are 292 
already cyborgs [7,37,38] and epitomise the posthuman condition where cyborg 293 
connections are neither good nor bad, but unavoidably present [39,40]. This does not 294 
mean that enwheelment is neutral for people experiencing it. Rather, this inexorable 295 
process is compelling, and the way people respond, make plans and act towards it does 296 
make a difference.    297 
When the expectations, desires and experiences of wheelchair users do 298 
harmonise with the posthuman condition inherent to enwheelment, the process of 299 




it. This is the case of several people who participated in a small but significant corpus of 301 
studies on enwheelment [4,5,6,8,29,30,41]. To summarise, the majority of participants 302 
from these studies emphasize that the wheelchair ‘became part of them’. That is, they 303 
became en-wheeled with the wheelchair. They established and reaffirmed a 304 
communicative relationship with the wheelchair, developing a positive cyborg identity. 305 
Mirroring Frank’s idea of disability as a quest for developing a new self in meaningful 306 
ways, these peoples’ process of becoming en-wheelment were affirmative, non-tragic 307 
[29].  308 
As we showed, Patrick’s enwheelment was distinct. Patrick became en-wheeled 309 
against the wheelchair. Adapting Frank’s [42] theorisation of the body problems in 310 
action to human–non-human assemblages, this relationship with the wheelchair was 311 
monadic in nature. That is, Patrick did not related to the wheelchair, but rather pushed it 312 
away, using it as a negative reference; he lived among it, but not with it. In terms of 313 
Patrick’s embodied experience, the wheelchair was felt in the flesh as not a part of him, 314 
but apart from him.  315 
In the light of the foregoing, we interpret that Patrick lived a humanist-based 316 
enwheelment. From a humanist lenses, wheelchair users become known and know 317 
themselves in terms of what they are not (abled) and cannot do (walk). They are 318 
“lacking subjects who might (if luck holds out) be made better through ableist 319 
rehabilitation” [43, p. 235]. Notably, the humanist logic assumes that human beings 320 
participate in a common essence, that they possess a set of essential attributes that 321 
secure a human status. For example, walking would be considered part of normal 322 
species functioning for humans. This essentialism generates an epistemic violence 323 
against disabled people, excluding them from full human status [17,39]. To be 324 




(e.g., the capacity to walk). This essentialist (and ableist) notion of a species norm is 326 
evoked in Straus’ argument on the upright posture: ‘Upright posture characterizes the 327 
human species. Nevertheless, each individual has to struggle in order to make it really 328 
his own. Man has to become what he is’ [44, p. 534]. What this speaks to in the context 329 
of this paper is that the restitution assemblage channels the humanist process of fighting 330 
to recuperate the innate set of attributes or characteristics of the essential human that 331 
have been troubled by impairment and, as Patrick pointed out, the wheelchair. This is 332 
why, despite its emphasis on self-containment, independence and sovereignty, 333 
humanism celebrates those human-non human assemblages as compatible with the 334 
archetypal, able-bodied human. An instance of this is Patrick’s acceptance of his 335 
massive prosthesis as a part-of-me, in contrast of his rejection of the wheelchair. 336 
Positive and negative enwheelment: a continuum 337 
Above, we have invited to consider, first, that enwheelment is inherently 338 
posthuman and, second, that it can be experienced in different ways depending on the 339 
conceptions of agency, disability and the human of the person becoming en-wheeled. In 340 
this consideration there are two key conceptions or logics doing a key work to shape the 341 
experience of enwheelment, and therefore two different modes of becoming en-342 
wheeled. At first, we called them humanist and posthumanist enwheelment. These labels 343 
were consistent with our theoretical reflections, and could be welcomed and gain 344 
acceptance within certain academic circles, such as Disability Studies. Nonetheless, this 345 
vocabulary might not be manageable and memorable for mainstream, professional and 346 
non-specialised academic audiences. This is problematic, and points out the need of 347 
‘translating’ the concepts in ways that are catchy and usable in different settings. 348 
Therefore, we propose using the terms ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ as nicknames of 349 




Importantly, these updated labels keep the soul of our theoretical approach. 351 
‘Negative’ reflects the humanist view of enwheelment as a lack or a problem to be 352 
solved, while ‘positive’ is linked with the “positive identity of impairment” [29, p. 353 
1332] embraced by the “affirmative politics” of posthumanism [45].ii More importantly, 354 
the labels ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ are accessible and invitational, and thus valuable for 355 
sharing our key messages more effectively to readers, helping them to connect with 356 
ideas productively, plug into them, and put them to work [46].  357 
In spite of the greater potential of the terms ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ for 358 
knowledge dissemination, as frequently occurs with ‘everyday terms’, we are conscious 359 
that there is a danger of establishing an illusion of generalizable labels that can be used 360 
uncritically across contexts [47]. In this sense, Buchanan [48, p. 458] cautioned against 361 
a “plain language approach” to concepts, that is, assuming we know what words that 362 
seem ordinary mean. To avoid misunderstandings, the concepts ‘positive’ and 363 
‘negative’ enwheelment have to be situated in the onto-epistemological, political and 364 
theoretical contexts that we have described in the paper. To facilitate and promote such 365 
conceptual awareness, but also to take into account the range of variations that can 366 
operate in between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ enwheelment, we propose the following 367 
continuum (Figure 2).  368 
 369 
 370 




 Becoming against the wheelchair 
Humanist standpoint 









Becoming with the wheelchair 
Posthumanist standpoint 












Within the proposed continuum, multiple ‘relational modalities’ (i.e., ways of 373 
connecting to or disconnecting from the wheelchair) are possible [5]. These are not 374 
permanent or definitive. Across time, a person can move across the continuum without 375 
following a predetermined order [5]. This way, the continuum respects the idea that the 376 
human body-wheelchair assemblage is a temporary, fluid and mobile connection that is 377 
adjusted and modified depending on its connections with other agents and agentic 378 
assemblages. Although the polarisation of the terms negative and positive suggests 379 
archetypical modes of enwheelment, the continuum also allows understanding of 380 
liminal or ambivalent zones, as well as overlapping cyborgification processes.  381 
Let us pause here, for a moment, and consider the example of the Patrick-382 
Prostheses assemblage. As we indicated earlier, Patrick became with the prosthesis, but 383 
he did so in order to achieve restitution and all that this involves. This shows that 384 
cyborgification process can be positive and negative at the same time. We believe this 385 
ambivalence is not a weakness of our theoretical frame. Rather, it signals the intricate 386 
nature of cyborgification, and the utility of the continuum for sensing conflicts and 387 
paradoxes. Therefore, another strength of the continuum is that it motivates reflection 388 
on the complexities and nuances that enwheelment, and more broadly cyborgification, 389 
entails.  390 
Finally, it is worth clarifying that the continuum is not meant to be hierarchical 391 
or evaluative. Quite the reverse, we reject any dichotomist, prescriptive or moral 392 
temptation to cause a rift between good or preferable positive enwheelment, in contrast 393 
to a wrong or bad negative one. In this regard, here we did not seek to condemn 394 
rehabilitation practices focused on restitution, which makes significant strides in helping 395 




close to its former, pre-injured state.  397 
That being said, it can be argued that developing a positive relationship with the 398 
wheelchair is important and necessary for disabled people in terms of flourishing and 399 
living a good life in the long run. When disabled bodies need wheelchairs, they may 400 
need to move away from the rigidity and narrowness of humanism and engage with 401 
posthumanism, which means exploring new modes of being cyborg through interfacing 402 
positively with the technologies to which they depend upon. This direction is taken by 403 
critical posthumanist approach in an explicit and direct manner. As Braidotti [45, p. 404 
134) put it, posthuman critical thought aims “at transformation of negative into positive 405 
passions”.  406 
Such a transformation, however, is not straightforward. As Papadimitriou [6] 407 
pointed out, becoming en-wheeled involves a constant challenge of negotiating, 408 
reorganizing and reconfiguring one’s way of being and doing. In this sense, it is also 409 
worth noting that flourishing with the wheelchair is not only about meaning and about 410 
accomplishment, but also includes hardships, limitation, and failure in the process [49]. 411 
Hence, people living with impairments may need to take their time to incorporate the 412 
wheelchair [3,4], and perhaps acknowledge that becoming one with the wheelchair 413 
straightaway post-SCI may be as unrealistic as quickly returning to their former, able 414 
body.   415 
 416 
Conclusions and implications 417 
This paper has engaged with posthuman disability studies to provide 418 
understanding about the process of becoming en-wheeled. Concretely, it has explored a 419 
cyborg assemblage comprised by a man living with SCI and his manual wheelchair. The 420 




might be lived within the restitution assemblage. The Patrick-wheelchair coupling is 422 
just a small part of the networks of humans and non-humans that form the restitution 423 
assemblage. However, we have showed how focussing on this intimate assemblage may 424 
help us to understand with more depth one of the many ways restitution is materialized, 425 
and not just drawn as a story a person draws on to shape experiences. For example, we 426 
have showed how restitution emplotted the wheelchair as a barrier to independence and 427 
mobilised practices of ableist rehabilitation to break the cyborg assemblage formed 428 
between Patrick and his wheelchair. Here, it is noteworthy that the use we have made of 429 
the notion ‘restitution’. Instead of applying restitution as simply a narrative resource, we 430 
have articulated it as a more-than-human concept that helped us addressing both the 431 
narrative and material forces that made up the realities of live for Patrick [Reference 432 
removed for double blind review 2]. 433 
The analysis indicated that Patrick’s process of becoming en-wheeled was 434 
developed negatively (against the wheelchair), rather than positively (with the 435 
wheelchair). The restitution assemblage was underpinned by a broader humanist logic 436 
that disregarded connectivity. In contrast with much of the previous literature on the 437 
process of becoming en-wheeled, Patrick’s process was not oriented to fit himself and 438 
the wheelchair together, but rather to divorce from the wheelchair and recuperate the 439 
normative capacities of the able-bodied human (i.e., walking) that humanism regards as 440 
essential. Deepening on this issue, our discussion derived in a continuum articulating 441 
the notions of negative and positive enwheelment. We have already explained what the 442 
continuum is, but it remains some important questions: For what and for whom is the 443 
continuum useful? To do what? Our intention is that this theoretic frame could help 444 




practitioners, such as physiotherapists, rehabilitation workers, SCI support staff, and 446 
other relevant health professionals, as well as disability scholars.  447 
First, the continuum may prove useful for wheelchair users to know, name and 448 
critically reflect on how enwheelment is affecting their lives, as well as to educate them 449 
towards the potentialities of other ways of being and doing through enwheelment. For 450 
example, a disabled person whose only reason to engage in a rehabilitation program was 451 
avoiding the wheelchair was made aware of the humanist (essentialist and ableist) 452 
nature of negative enwheelment, he/she may be prompted to do rehabilitation also as a 453 
means to “feel the wheelchair”, in line with a positive mode of enwheelment [3].  454 
Second, using the continuum as a guide or reference can facilitate practitioners 455 
recognising the potentials and perils in certain assemblages and helping clients to 456 
incorporate assistive technologies in ways that support flourishing. In this sense, the 457 
continuum may sensitise practitioners on their approach to rehabilitation practice, 458 
including what is valued and discouraged, which in turn influences clients’ “feeling of 459 
dependency” [4]. It can do so because the ideas of positive and negative suggest an 460 
ethical and practical question: which is the direction that enwheelment processes should 461 
take? This thought-provoking question may act on professionals, demanding them to 462 
adopt a position. Be that as it may, taking into account the posthumanist nature of 463 
enwheelment (of both positive and negative enwheelment), rehabilitation practice 464 
becomes not a relationship of assistance between an active practitioner and a passive 465 
rehabilitation receiver, but rather a collective attention to the relationships –the 466 
connections– that develop between the person, the wheelchair, and the surrounding 467 
assemblages –such as restitution-. The theoretical frame we have proposed allows the 468 
nature or these relationships to be quickly identified amidst the messy, complexity that 469 




Finally, our theoretical frame might be useful for disability scholars willing to 471 
examine enwheelment and, more broadly, different modes of cyborgification or human-472 
non human assemblages involving different contexts (e.g. sport), populations (e.g. 473 
elderly people), impairments (e.g. cerebral palsy) and disability artifacts (e.g. assistive 474 
listening devices). This is not though to impose the interpretations suggested here onto 475 
people or their research. Nor is it an attempt to equip readers with a one-size-fits-all 476 
theoretical model. Rather than aspiring to offer the final word on enwheelment or other 477 
cyborgification processes, the present study seeks to encourage curiosity in the reader 478 
and inspire dialogue. In this sense, the paper stands out for its potential for heuristic 479 
significance [2] that is, for moving people to further explore, research, or act on the 480 
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i We use italics and inverted commas to insert Patrick’s voice in the text. 
 
ii  In our theoretical proposition, the notion of positive enwheelment is not linked to the 
positive psychology approach, which often depoliticises disability and promotes an 
individualistic vision of human flourishing. Contrariwise, it draws on the posthuman 
critique of humanist individualism, meaning that it challenges the negative connotation 
of dependency and injects a positive view on our relational existence.  
                                                          
